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THE NEAR EAST
A lecture delivered by

Professor Hans Kohn
at the Naval War College
November 5, 1948

As y�u know from my lecture on Russia, I am convinced
that we cannot approach any problem today except by seeing it in
its historical perspective. It was exactly one hundred fifty years

.ago that the Near or Middle Eastern question was opened up for
Western Europe.

For we may say that before 1798 the Near and

Middle East entered the attention of Europe or the Western world

little, if at all. The Mediterranean, the Middle East, which had
been the center of world politics and the center of world civiliza
tion until about 1450 of our era, disappeared entirely from our
sight after that. It may be said that Columbus went to discover

America, (which as you know he never intended to do) because

of the very fact that the Mediterranean had been closed, the Near
East had been obliterated, and with the Near East the two great

Asiatic trade. routes, the two trade routes from Europe to the
Far East, one -leading through Alexandria and the Red Sea, the

second through Antioch and the Persian Gulf. These two trade
routes, from antiquity until 1400 had been the most important
eommercial routes of history, those on which depended the import

.ance of Italy. Both in antiquity and in the middle ages, the vital
ity and leadership of Italy, of Rome and later of Venice and Gen
oa, arid the phenomenon of the Renaissance would have been im

possible without Italy's geographic strategic position in relation
to these two trade routes. In the 15th century the victory of the
Turks closed these· trade · routes to Western mankind.

With that

Professor Kohn is Professor of History at Smith College. His
lecture on "Russia" appeared in a previous issue of the "Information
Service."
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moment began the decay of Italy, the decay of the Mediterranean
and the rise of the Atlantic powers.
It was one hundred fifty years ago that the strategic genius
of Napoleon reopened the Middle East and discovered what is in
my mind the most important fact in the world situation today,
namely : that the Middle East is the strategic hub of the Old
World. Whoever controls the Middle East undoubtedly controls
the Old World. General Bonaparte who, as you all know, was a

Mediterranean, born in Corsica, was keenly aware of it. He was
never a Frenchman by geographic loyalty; his only real loyalty
belonged to the Mediterranean. He dreamt, as in our own time

his small imitator Mussolini did, of the resurrection of the Mediter
ranean empire, not anymore for its own sake but as a key for the

control of the world. In 1798, Bonaparte had the immensely daring
conception, a conception similar to that of Alexander the Great,
to land an expeditionary force in Egypt and to push on from Egypt

through Syria, Iraq and Iran into India.

He was fascinated by

the idea which, since then, all world conquerors have had, whether
it was Hitler, Mussolini or Stalin, to destroy the British Empire
as the only bulwark standing between, on the one hand, the aspira
tion to world domination, and on the other hand, the world of

liberty. He wished to deal the British Empire a deadly blow by
going across the ancient land route to India. You know he pushed on
from Egypt to Palestine and Haifa, as we call it today, and it was

only because of the pestilence in camp and because of certain news

coming from France that he had to call off his venture and return
to France. From this moment two things remained. . One is what

I would call "the regeneration of Islam." Napoleon's administration
in Egypt, though very short-lived, left deep traces. There was a

man of energy, ruthlessness, strength.

His name was Mohamed

Ali, a simple soldier in the Turkish Army, an Albanian by birth.
By his intelligence, and by his unscrupulous .ruthlessness he made
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himself governor or pasha of Egypt, then a Turkish province. As
pasha he learned enough fr<?m French influence to wish to modernize
Egypt, to create a modern army, even to begin a modern navy, to
introduce modern economy. Islam was awakened from hundreds
of years of lethargy, apathy and sleep. The present king of Egypt,
Farouk is a descendant of the Mohamed Ali whom I have just
mentioned.
But the second, and more important consideration for us is
that Napoleon drew attention to the long forgotten trade routes
and the strategic position of the Middle East and drew the at
tention of the British there, and from that moment on it has been
British policy to make sure that the Middle East does not fall
into the hands of any great military power and that the Middle
East will be kept open. From 1798 until today, all British foreign
policy and all British strategy has been dominated by the one con
viction not to allow any great military power to establish itself in
the Middle East. Today we have inherited the British task both
politically and strategically. It is, in my opinion, our foremost
consideration not to allow any great military power to claim ex
clusive control of the Middle East, because whoever holds. the Mid
dle East, holds Africa,.Asia and Europe. This has been shown very
clearly in the two wars which have been fought, since Napoleon,
for world control.

c.:

The two wars fought for world control, World War I, and
World War II, both had one of the decisive battlefields in the Near
East. It was much less noticed in the United States, yet in World
War I the Germans made a very determined effort, with the
help of the Turks, to capture the Suez Canal and to drive the
British out of the Middle East. At that time the attempt was
made from the east, with the help of Turkey, to the Suez Canal.
The British defeated the attempt and, in a counter-attack, oc
cupied Jerusalem and later drove up to Syria. There is one im-
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portant point in this struggle in World War I against Germany
and Turkey: the British tried to enlist the cooperation of the Arabs.
The Turks were then the enemies of Britain and allied with Ger
many. The only people who could be organized against the Turks
were the Arabs. The Arabs were the first great force in Islam,
the first great conquering race of the Mohammedan religion. They
had been obscured and dominated by the Turks, and the British
now tried to reawaken their national pride, the memory of the
centuries of Arab greatness. They were quite successfully sup
ported in that indirectly by Americans since the most important
educational institutions in the Arab world were the American insti
tutions, especially the American University of Beirut in Lebanon,
the greatest educational institution in the Near East. The Ameri
can missionaries there tried to arouse an Arab awakening which
had no connection with that provoked by the British. The Ameri
can one had been more on the intellectual side, educational ; the
British one more on the· military, political side. The British ap
pealed above all to the Arab ruler, to the Arab sheik in Mecca, in
the capital of Islam, in the foremost city of Mohammedan
tradition, where a descendant of Mohammed himself, by the name
of Hussein Ibn Ali was then the leading member of the aristocracy,
or as the Arabs called it, the Sharif of Mecca. His son is Ab
dullah, King of Trans-Jordan at present, and from that fact we
can understand both the long lasting British ties with Ab
dullah of Trans-Jordan and Abdullah's ambition to play .a great
role in the Arabic or Mohammedan world-for Abdullah is the
only surviving son of Hussein of Mecca. It was a romantic Eng
lishman, one of the strange figures with which the otherwise gen
erally "dull" British stock is quite rich, this rather strange exotic
figure, T. E. Lawrence, who went out to Arabia and started what
he descri.bed as the "revolt in the desert."• The British suc
ceeded, with the help of·the Arabs in defeating the Turks and the
German attempt to dominate the Middle East.
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In World War II the Middle East was again a decisive
battlefield. You gentlemen will remember as much as I do the
fateful month of June 1940 when the German armies had
triumphed all over Europe; when Hitler and Stalin were close
friends and allies, when France lay crushed and when Italy had
joined the war on the side of Germany to be in for the kill of
the French and British empires; when Marshal Petain, certain
ly a soldier of some knowledge, expected that within three weeks
- Britain would fall. At that moment the question was for me, who
knew the Middle East very well, not what would happen in the
British Isles but what would happen in the Middle East, because
if the Hitler-Mussolini combination had taken. hold of the Middle
East, . then there was no doubt with me that Asia. was lost to Hit-.
ler and the Japanese. Lost, I am entirely convinced, irrevoc;ably for
any foreseeable future. At that moment Mussolini entered the war,
and at that time we did not know, though some of us suspected,
that the famous Fascist army, navy, and air force did not exist
really. We all were impressed by Mussolini. You remember his
picture in the papers then, with open mouth, his jaw forward, de
claring that "In the next war, Italian bayonets will decide the
war and Italian airplanes will blacken the skies." It was in 1938
that he declared that to the Italian senate. You may remember
that the air force impressed us when Balbo flew over with his
fliers to Chicago, so much so that I think even today an' avenue
in Chicago is called Avenue Balbo. In any case, it impressed us
tremendously. And now in June 1940 the British had 30,000
men along the Suez canal with about 500 second rate planes. The
30,000 men were mostly imperial colonial troops, Australians, with
some Negroes from Africa, and others. Mussolini had 150,000
men of the best soldiers in Eritrea and the same number under
the Duke of Aosta in Ethiopia. I was afraid then that the su
perior Italian air force and the two armies; could move in a pin25
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cer movement on Egypt and the Suez canal, liquidate thE:! British
situation there, and establish an impregnable situation for the
Axis from Morrocco to China. If that had happened, our land
ing in Africa would not have succeeded.
It was because of the unique luck and the courage of the
British that the Italians, and later Rommel, were defeated. I am en
tirely convinced that, should a next war come, and I have good
reasons to believe that it will not come if the West be
comes really united and prepared, that the decisive spot will
again be the Middle East. That is the reason why we must make
sure, and are making sure I think successfully, that the Middle

The

East does not fall into Russian hands.
Russians have tried
days of Catherine
the
since
East
Middle
the
of
to gain control
the II, who conquered the Crimea, the North Shore of the Black
Sea. Catherine hated her son, the future Czar Paul, but loved

her grandchildren. She selected their names, not Paul, and she
named her oldest grandchild Alexander, in memory of Alexander

the Great who conquered Asia, and named her second son Con
stantine in memory of Constantine the First, who established Con

stantinople, Byzantium, as the seat of the world empire. From
the days of Catherine II to the days of Stalin, the Middle East has
been the prime ambition of the Russians. The British never tried
to occupy or rule the Middle East. Primarily they wished to ex
clude Russia and Napoleon and the Germans. Our policy is the
same. We are int�rested in excluding Russia, and so far we have
done well. I can assure you from a close knowledge of the Middle
East, where I lived for eight years, and from a study of the

situation in the Middle East, that we have succeeded beyond any
body's expectations, with relatively small cost so far, in averting
an imminent threat to the Middle East which two years ago seemed

unavertable.

If we could achieve in China what we have done in the
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Middle East, I think we could begin to feel much more secure
than we do now.
Two years ago Greece was threatened from Albania, Yugo
slavia and Bulgaria. Greece is important for us because the Greeks
are the only sea-faring people in the Near and Middle East. Neither

the Russians nor the Turks nor the Arabs nor the Persians are a
sea-faring people. The Greeks are, by their history and by the_ir
whole geography. Their islands are strategic islands and Greece

is destined to be the key to further Russian penetration. East of
Greece is Turkey and two years ago the Russians put forward
strong demands for a large part of Eastern Anatolia. There is a
claim, which is not unfounded, that centuries ago Armenians lived
there. But you can't turn the wheel of history back centuries,
though many nationalists are trying it. Three Soviet professors
proved to their own satisfaction: and that of 'Mr. Stalin that

northern Turkey, on the shore of the Black Sea, had once been
Georgian territory that should be annexed to Soviet Georgia.

Turkey would thus lose all Kurdistan, these commanding heights
from which the road to the Persian Gulf lies open. Secondly the
Russians claimed then the right to put their bases into the Dar
danelles, which would have practically meant domination of

Istanbul or Constantinople and of Turkey.

The third important

thing is that, two years ago a Soviet puppet government, backed
by Soviet troops, was established in Iran, in Azerbaijan. This

government was a threat to Turkey and to the Persian Gulf. That
was the situation two years ago, and everybody was convinced that

if Russian armed columns break through to the Persian Gulf, that
means to our oil fields there, nothing could stop them.

Now two years have gone by. There is no actual threat
whatsoever at present to Greece or Turkey or to Iran. The Soviet
government in Azerbaijan has been liquidated. All Russian troops
are out of Iran. No new demands for Turkish territory are voiced
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although the situation in Greece is rotten and will remain rotten,
for the very simple reason that the Greek nation has never yet
learned to work together without being at the brink of a civil
war. In spite of that, no Russian or Yugoslav or Bulgarian soldier
has transgressed into Greece; on the other hand the front of Stalin
on the frontiers of Greece has been broken. Yugoslavia is to

day no longer an entirely dependable satellite of Russia, an aston
ishing change. Two years ago Greece was Russia's; today Stalin
cannot be very certain of Tito's Yugoslavia. So I would say that,
so far as I can see, the situation in the Middle East, with rather
little expenditure, has been immensely strengthened.
That is important, not only for strategic reasons, but also

for the oil.

You all know about the British oil which exists in
southwestern Persia. The concession in northern Iraq is one half
British, one fourth American and one fourth French.

By far the

most important concession of all, those in Saudi Arabia, are en
tirely American. This oil is needed for three purposes. One is
for the economic recovery of Europe under the Marshall plan. We
can't send oil from the U. S. The Europeans have no oil; theirs

comes from the Middle East.

The Russians don't wish Europe to
recover. They would like to cut up the Middle Eastern oil. Second,
the British navy depends upon the Middle Eastern oil and the Brit
ish navy is as much our interest as our navy is. And third, even
our navy depends on Middle Eastern oil.

Now some people here in the United States tell you "Why
should we worry about the profits of the Standard Oil Com
pany?" I must tell you that they are right. We should not worry
about the profits of the Standard Oil Company. But the whole
question thus put, is pure demagogy. We need the oil from the
Middle East, irrespective of any profit or not, for our strategic
survival. If people come and tell you that the State Department
is following a certain policy in the Middle East because it is
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subservient to the oil interests, that is the barest nonsense! We
must hold the Middle East for our survival-strategically, and be
cause we·need the oil, not for the profits for the Standard Oil Com
pany. Our vital national interests are involved there.
That is one point, and the second point is that we cannot
hold these regions without close cooperation with the native peoples.
That is what the British learned. The British did not know it fifty
years ago; the British . learned that they cannot rely on India or
Pakistan, on Arabia or Turkey, without the sympathy and coopera
tion of the native populations; These native populations, the Turk,
Arab, Iranian or Persian, are today in a state of national awaken
ing, of the awakening of political consciousness, in a feeling of im
mense pride which can be very easily hurt. They are not like the
British or-ourselves, so secure that they would riot mind pin-pricks
or anything like that. They are immensely jealous of their national
position. And I am entirely convinced that we cannot hold these
regions without the sympathy of the native populations on our side.
The British enlisted the sympathy of the Arabs in World War II,
especially of the two most important · Arab rulers. One was Ibn
Saud, the king of Saudi Arabia, a very strong personality, a man
of unusual power as you probably know. King Ibn Saud is a man
of about sbtty-eight just now. King Ibn Saud began his life as a
small sheikh. He was a small potentate leading fanatical Mo
hammedans called the Wahhabis. It was through their fanaticism
and his genius of leadership that he conquered the whole of
Arabia. For the first time sin�e Mohammed, he .united the whole
of Arabia and brought peace and order there. Ibn Saud is un
doubtedly a person of unusual strength, a commanding personal
ity, who created in the desert, in the immense poverty of the nomad
ic tribes what was, for the first time, a progressive orderly govern
ment. The second man is King Abdullah of Trans-Jordan, the only
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surviving son of Hussein of Mecca. The British understood that
they had to enlist the friendship of these two . men, and it was
due to their friendship that in World War II, in the most tragic
situation in the Middle East, the Arabs did not cut the British com
munications.

Though the Arab could have never waged open war,

they could have been very damaging if they wanted to, but they

stood loyally with Britain.

Britain cannot forget that.

Britain

knows that her security and by her security, our security, depends

on establishing friendship with the Arabs and with the Turks.

And now in the last few words I wish to talk about the

Turks because there is nothing more astonishirtg and nothing more

indicative of the future of the Middle East than the transforma
tion of Turkey. Some of you may have been to Turkey before

World War I.

Some American ships sailing there remember the

entirely oriental, backward, medieval country then ruled by a Sul
tan, a ruler who was at the same time the spiritual head of the
state. Turkey was entirely ruled by Mohammedan medieval law.

The women had, to go veiled; polygamy existed; there was no
modern social life whatsoever. After World War I, Turkey under

a great military leader Mustafa Kemal (or as he was called later
Kemal Ataturk) drove out the invading Greeks, and for the first
time in one hundred fifty years Turkey became entirely )nde
pendent from the . intrigues and controls . of foreign powers. Mus
tafa Kemal now began what I regard as the most successful pro-,
cess of modernization done anywhere in Asia. Much more suc
cessful than not only the other Asiatic peoples but also than

the Communists, because Mustafa Kemal did it without any super
ffous cruelty, without barbarizing the land. He tried to establish
there something like a modern European nation and he has suc
ceeded to an astonishing degree; Greece today is torn by internal
dissension, Greece is not a nation. Persia is a backward country,
certainly not a nation, and the Russians could cut through Persia
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like a knife cuts through butter. Turkey is different; Turkey is an
organic, integrated nation since Mustafa Kemal. It would be a
tremendous task for the Russians to conquer Turkey, and they

know it very well. The "secularization" of Turkey took her away

from her ancient Mohammedan medieval order to be modernized
and to be equipped as a modern nation. Think only of the position
of the women; there is no polygamy in Turkey anymore. In
Turkey today modern European law absolutely prevails.

Women

are no longer veiled; women can participate fully in all social and
political life, a tremendous change in a few years time. I am

convinced that in that direction all the Middle Eastern people will

go. It will take much longer with the Arabs, or with the Persians.
The Arabs are today disunited; still not a modern nation like the
Turks but they are on the way to it and it is· immensely im
portant, as the British have understood, to help this develop
ment forward instead of trying to hinder it.
I am optimistic about the Middle East. Our position in the
Middle East, or the British one, which is for all practical pur
poses one and the same, is strategically sound and can be and

will be, in my opinion, politically sound, because we need the Mid
dle East and ultimately the Middle East needs us, needs us not
only for protection against Russia. The Middle East cannot en
ter by its own strength upon a sound policy of economic and
social modernization-only American and British capital and
American and British educational and technical help can provide

the means. One hundred fifty years ago the Middle East was
opened up. Since then it has formed a bridge between Europe,
Asia and Africa. I'm convinced it is a strong bridge, one which
can easily become a very important factor in the defense system of
Western civilization and world peace.
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